RFC 1337: AYBABTU Protocol
Distributed Control & Blockchain Integration

+---------------------+         +---------------------+         +---------------------+
|      Initiator      |         |     Controller      |         |     Validators      |
+---------------------+         +---------------------+         +---------------------+
        |                                 |                                 |
        | 1. BASE_ANNOUNCE                |                                 |
        |-------------------------------->|                                 |
        |                                 |                                 |
        |                                 | 2. BASE_TAKEOVER                |
        |                                 |-------------------------------->|
        |                                 |                                 |
        |                                 | 3. BASE_ACK                     |
        |                                 |<--------------------------------|
        |<--------------------------------|                                 |
        |                                 |                                 |
        | 4. Blockchain Event Log (all phases, finality, audit)             |
        |<=============================== | ===============================>|
        |                                 |                                 |
        |--- TCP SYN/ACK, TLS 1.3 Handshake, ECDHE, Mutual Auth ----------->|
        |<------------------------------->|<------------------------------->|
        |                                 |                                 |
        |--- ECDSA/BLS Signatures, ZKP, JWT, Merkle Proofs ---------------->|
        |<------------------------------->|<------------------------------->|
        |                                 |                                 |
        |--- Each phase: 15s max, ACK: 5s, nanosecond precision ----------->|
        |                                 |                                 |
        |--- Violations: SIEM alert, syslog, webhook ---------------------->|
        |                                 |                                 |
        |--- All messages logged and audited on-chain --------------------->|
        |                                 |                                 |
  

{
"version": "1.0.3b", // Protocol version
"nonce": "0xA1B2C3D4", // 32-bit CSPRNG hex, unique per message
"network_id": "net-42", // Network identifier
"timestamp": 1717353600123, // UNIX epoch (ms), NTP-synced, drift <= 5ms
"initiator_pubkey": "02ab...ef", // 33-byte compressed ECDSA (secp256k1)
"merkle_root": "e3b0c442...98fc1", // SHA-256 Merkle root of state snapshot
"proof_of_possession": "3045...0221", // ECDSA signature over [nonce|timestamp|merkle_root]
// Encoding: JSON, UTF-8, CRLF, ECDSA-SHA256 signature appended (base64)
// Transmission: TCP, TLS 1.3 (ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM), session keys via ECDH
// Error: Signature fail/log/alert, timestamp ±10s: reject/log
// Blockchain: Validators verify Merkle root, BLS aggregate, quorum 2/N
}

{
"version": "1.0.3b",
"nonce": "0xE5F6A7B8",
"network_id": "net-42",
"timestamp": 1717353601456,
"controller_pubkey": "03cd...ab", // ECDSA (secp256k1)
"challenge_response": "zkp:0x...", // Zero-knowledge proof (Schnorr/Bulletproofs)
"session_token": "eyJhbGciOi...jwt", // JWT, signed by controller, claims: exp, nbf, aud, perms
// Consensus: Validators verify ZKP, SHA-256(BASE_TAKEOVER), record tx_hash, block_height
// Error: Invalid ZKP: reject/blacklist pubkey 1h; Expired session_token: reject/log
}

{
"version": "1.0.3b",
"nonce": "0xC9D8E7F6",
"network_id": "net-42",
"timestamp": 1717353601999,
"block_hash": "a3b1...9f", // SHA-256 of block containing BASE_TAKEOVER
"finality_proof": "bls:0x...", // BLS aggregate signature for block finality
"audit_trail": [
  {"tx": "d4e5...c1", "sig": "3045...0221"},
  ...
],
// Validators: quorum, block finality (BLS threshold), only send ACK after finalization
// Security: All messages logged on-chain, SIEM alert on unauthorized/unsigned
}

Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) enable a prover to demonstrate knowledge of a secret without revealing it, ensuring privacy and security within the protocol. The AYBABTU protocol integrates ZKPs to:

• Authenticate parties without exposing private keys.
• Validate transactions and state transitions while preserving confidentiality.
• Ensure compliance with governance rules without revealing sensitive data.

Integration in Protocol Phases:

• BASE_ANNOUNCE: Optional Schnorr NIZK proof to demonstrate possession of the initiator's private key.
• BASE_TAKEOVER: Challenge response implemented as a ZKP (e.g., Bulletproofs or zk-SNARKs) proving authorization without revealing secrets.
• BASE_ACK: zk-SNARKs used to prove audit trail integrity without disclosing transaction details.

Technical Specifications:

• Supported schemes include Schnorr NIZK, zk-SNARKs, and Bulletproofs.
• Proofs must be sound with negligible error < 2^-128.
• Trusted setup ceremonies are required for zk-SNARKs to avoid toxic waste.
• Hardware acceleration is recommended for proof generation and verification.

Security Considerations:

• Use formally verified ZKP libraries.
• Protect against side-channel attacks and timing leaks.
• Prefer post-quantum ZKP schemes for long-term security.

All protocol messages must be cryptographically signed and encrypted. Every event is immutably logged on a tamper-evident blockchain. Unauthorized or unsigned transitions are automatically rejected by consensus nodes, ensuring strict compliance and traceability.